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Europe’s “Others” in the Polar Mediterranean 
 
ABSTRACT 
A large body of literature problematizes the role of the Mediterranean, as both 
civilizational hearth and liminal frontier, in both ancient and modern Europe. 
However, much less attention has been directed to the inland sea at Europe’s 
northern edge: the Arctic.  Increasingly, as the Arctic becomes attractive to non-
Arctic European capitals as a potential site of investment and (in)security, European 
states, and perhaps the EU as a whole, are seeking to construct the Arctic, like the 
Mediterranean, as a space that is both marginal and central to the continent’s future.  
This paper seeks to investigate the extent to which the Arctic is, to paraphrase 
Viljhalmur Stefansson, Europe’s “Polar Mediterranean” and what this means for 
Europe as it constructs institutions and identities that, as in the Mediterranean, use 
the concept of the inland sea to both incorporate and differentiate its internal and 
external “others.” 
 
KEY WORDS: Arctic, Mediterranean, Orientalism, Polar Mediterranean, 
Postcolonialism, Viljhalmur Stefansson 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mediterranean looms large in European identity-myths. From its long-held 
imagined role as the hearth of modern civilization to its contemporary (and equally 
imagined) function as a barrier that secures its borders and regulates immigration, 
the Mediterranean has a crucial role in the narratives by which Europe constructs 
its unified identity and defines itself against, and in relation to, proximate yet 
subordinate “others” (Celata & Coletti 2012). Indeed, the Mediterranean is where 
Said’s (1978) “Orient” begins.  
However, the Mediterranean is more than just an imagined barrier or culture 
hearth. It is also an inland sea and this gives it a specific role in facilitating both 
separation and connection. Just as the sea presents itself as a persistent, but also 
potentially crossable, divide for today’s African migrants, it provides a fertile 
environment for the combination of similitude and difference that characterizes 
orientalist tropes. The Mediterranean is both an inland sea and a border, and out of 
this spring a number of paradoxical functions: The Mediterranean affords Europe 
identity and differentiation, protection and vulnerability, opportunity and insularity.  
As James Sidaway (2013) notes, although regional categorizations can 
provide false senses of closure and unity they also can direct attention to the 
differences and power relations that are reproduced amidst everyday commercial 
and cultural exchanges. The Mediterranean, or, more specifically, mediterraneanism 
– the concept of thinking with the Mediterranean – thus emerges as a multifaceted 
geopolitical trope that conveys a variety of meanings, all of which are produced 
within the tension-filled vortices of power, differentiation, separation, and 
integration that characterize the postcolonial condition. This article explores the 
complexities of the mediterraneanist trope, with special attention to how the 
concept of mediterraneanism has migrated from Europe’s southern border to the 
Arctic, adding a northern dimension to the means by which Europe defines itself and 
its “others.” While Europe’s contemporary awakening to the opportunities for 
resource extraction, commerce, and social development (i.e. “modernization”) on its 
northern frontier suggests a radical change from earlier eras when polar ice was 
viewed as a barrier and a limit, the new (or, in fact, revived) construction of the 
Arctic as a “Polar Mediterranean” draws on long-held discursive constructions of 
borders, borderings, and regional essence. 
 
THINKING WITH MEDITERRANEANS 
While ocean basin regions have been promoted by some as alternatives to static and 
statist perspectives that valorize and naturalize terrestrial continents, in fact the 
designation of a maritime region, like the designation of a land region, carries with it 
a series of implicit meanings that promote some understandings and foreclose 
others (Lewis & Wigen 1999; Steinberg 2013). In particular, as Paolo Giaccaria and 
Claudio Minca (2011) discuss in their study of the Mediterranean, the idea of the 
maritime region reproduces and naturalizes the ideals of timeless unity amidst 
irreconcilable difference that lie at the center of postcolonial worldviews. Giaccaria 
and Minca discuss how the ocean at the center of the Mediterranean region links 
spaces and societies that are purported to be “naturally” different. The opposite 
sides of an inland sea exist in a regional unity, notwithstanding their division by a 
seemingly natural barrier. Because the ocean connects, even as it fails to 
homogenize, the societies within an ocean region appear to exist in a permanent 
universe of interchange that reproduces hierarchical relations. Continual interaction 
and self-definition within an environment of inequality is thereby not only justified; 
it is seen as natural. 
 All ocean regions, in this sense, embody the reification of hierarchy amidst 
assertions of a greater civilizational unity that Sidaway, drawing on postcolonial 
theory, associates with regions in general. However, these dynamics are especially 
apparent in the Mediterranean, the historic point of intersection between Europe 
and its most pervasive “other”: the Arab “Orient” (Chambers 2008). As Giaccaria and 
Minca write: 
[Amidst] a paradoxical interplay between different (and potentially 
conflictual) representations of this sea that alternate narratives of 
homogeneity and continuity with those of heterogeneity and 
discontinuity...[the rhetoric of mediterraneanism sustains] the belief in the 
existence of a geographical object called the Mediterranean, where different 
forms of proximity (morphological, climatic, cultural, religious, etc.) justify a 
specific rhetorical apparatus through the production of a simplified field of 
inquiry, otherwise irreducible to a single image. (Giaccaria & Minca 2011, p. 
348, emphasis in original) 
The Mediterranean thus comes to be seen as something that, although permanently 
divided, is also permanent in its wholeness: “The mediteraneisme de la fracture [is 
understood as]…something substantially immutable – a vision that resembles, in 
many ways, the cultural ‘containers’ imagined and celebrated in Orientalist colonial 
rhetoric and Romantic literature” (Giaccaria & Minca 2011, p. 353). 
 Giaccaria and Minca conclude their article at the Mediterranean’s edge, but, 
in fact the ultimate power of mediterraneanism, like all forms of orientalism, lies not 
simply in reproducing an ideal of stabilized difference but in the designation of this 
unity as a category that can then be integrated into systems of language and 
meaning that, in turn, are used to “understand” (and thereby design futures for) 
other peoples (Mignolo 2003, 2005). Put another way, the power of 
mediterraneanism (the idea of there being a distinct mediterranean region-type 
wherein interaction amidst difference is naturalized by the presence of an inland 
sea that simultaneously connects and divides) flows not just from its purported 
ability to explain the (upper-case) Mediterranean but from its functionality as an 
epistemological perspective wherein the presence of an inner sea (a lower-case 
mediterranean) is used to explain a generalized condition of difference amidst 
connection (Steinberg 2014). In short, the power of the mediterranean idea derives 
not just from its representation of a divided but unified ocean basin as “something 
substantially immutable” but from the idea’s existence as an “immutable mobile” 
(Latour 1987), an idea that travels. Employed as a geographic category, the idea of 
the mediterranean thus becomes, like other spatial metaphors, as notable for the 
options it forecloses as for those it opens up (Brown 2000; Smith & Katz 1993). 
 Yet as an idea travels it also undergoes translation (Clifford 1997), 
notwithstanding its claim to immutability. Indeed, although knowledge of the world 
emerges from one specific space and time, a spatial knowledge system’s power lies 
in its ability to mutate as it both connects and divides, producing concepts of both 
difference and similitude across and within spaces (Livingstone 2003; Livingstone & 
Withers 2011). The remainder of this article thereby turns not just to the travel, but 
also the translation of mediterraneanism in the construction of Europe’s northern 
“other.” 
 
THE ARCTIC AS POLAR MEDITERRANEAN 
The travel and translation of geographic imaginaries between the Mediterranean 
and the Arctic has a long and complex history, in which abjection over the Arctic’s 
apparent desolation is tinged with a degree of romanticism and longing. As Barry 
Lopez notes, 
The Old World regarded the Arctic as an inaccessible place. Beyond a certain 
gloomy and hostile border country, however, they did not imagine it as 
inhospitable. Indeed, in Greek myths this most distant part of the Arctic was 
a country of rich, lacustrine soils, soft azure skies, gentle breezes (zephyrs), 
fecund animals, and trees that bore fruit even in winter, a region farther 
north than the birthplace of the North Wind (Boreas). The inhabitants of 
Hyperborea, as it was called, were thought to be the oldest of the human 
races, and to be comparable themselves with the land – compassionate in 
temperament, knowing no want, of a contemplative bent. (Lopez 2001, pp. 
16-17; see also McGhee 2007) 
The modern application of mediterraneanism to the Arctic dates to the 
writings of Canadian-American anthropologist Vilhjalmur Stefansson, who, in the 
1920s, distanced himself from Arctic explorers of the era who boasted of their 
ability to sustain themselves in a harsh and hostile environment. Instead, Stefansson 
aligned himself more with the Ancient Greeks, writing of a “friendly Arctic” 
(Stefansson 1921) in which the local culture was harmonized with climatic 
conditions, which, he argued, were in fact not as miserable as often portrayed by 
outsiders. An ardent advocate of high-protein, animal-fat-based diets, Stefansson 
(1946) dismissed skeptics who felt that the low productivity of Arctic soils and 
minimal carbohydrate production might form a barrier to the rise of an agricultural 
surplus and urban-based modernization there. For the carnivorous Stefansson, the 
Arctic was not only friendly; it was fertile. 
 According to Stefansson, the potential of the Arctic was about to be realized 
by emergent transport technologies. Tapping into an emergent Canadian northern 
aviation aesthetic, in which the Arctic was coming to be understood as a sublime 
space that was both challenging and attainable in its awesome harshness and beauty 
(Cronin forthcoming), Stefansson (1922b) felt that with the advent of the airplane 
the Arctic was finally going to blossom as a mediterranean region in which 
interaction and trade among diverse neighboring cultures would lead to 
civilizational development. As he wrote in National Geographic Magazine: 
The map of the Northern Hemisphere shows that the Arctic Ocean is a huge 
Mediterranean. It lies between the continents somewhat as the 
Mediterranean lies between Europe and Africa. In the past it has been an 
impassable Mediterranean. In the near future, it will not only become 
passable, but will become a favorite air route between the continents, at least 
at certain seasons – safer, more comfortable, and consisting of shorter “hops” 
than any other air route that lies across the oceans that separate the present-
day centers of population. (Stefansson 1922a, p. 205) 
Stefansson expands on these remarks elsewhere, connecting the increased use of 
the Arctic as a transit hub with its development as a civilizational center: 
We would do well to go back to an Elizabethan custom and call it not the 
Arctic Ocean but the Polar Sea or Polar Mediterranean. The map shows that 
most of the land in the world is in the Northern Hemisphere, that the Polar 
Sea is like a hub from which the continents radiate like the spokes of a wheel. 
The white patch shows that the part of the Polar Sea never yet navigated by 
ships is small when compared to the surrounding land masses. In the coming 
air age, the…Arctic will be like an open park in the center of the uninhabited 
city of the world, and the air voyagers will cross it like taxi riders crossing a 
park. Then will the Arctic islands become valuable, first as way stations and 
later because of their intrinsic value — minerals, grazing, fisheries. (cited in 
Weigert et al. 1957, p. 247) 
 
Mediterraneans as culture hearths – Stefansson was a prominent explorer and 
promoter of Arctic colonization – he headed the 1913-1916 Canadian Arctic 
Expedition – whose writings and life have been analyzed extensively (Diubaldo 
1978; Hunt 1986; Gisli Pálsson 2003; Sawchuck 2008; Stuhl 2013). Of particular 
relevance for this article, though, is how, in pointing to the potential for civilizational 
development in the “Polar Mediterranean,” he references long-held beliefs about the 
(southern) Mediterranean as the heart of Western civilization, and then projects 
them northward to a new arena of mediterranean commerce and cultural exchange. 
Indeed, Stefansson makes this point explicitly in The Northward Course of Empire 
(Stefansson 1922b), in which he maps how, through the progression of time, the 
center of civilization has moved ever northwards, from a starting point in Upper 
Egypt (ca. 3400 BCE) on through Phoenicia, Athens, Rome, Florence/Venice, and 
London/Paris/New York, with the trend line pointing to Winnipeg as the next global 
metropole. 
 Leaving aside the methodological naïveté underlying Stefansson’s socio-
climatic model, The Northward Course of Empire is a highly racialized narrative (Gisli 
Pálsson 2003). Although Stefansson does consider historic non-Western 
civilizations, they drop out as the leading edge of progress advances northward. 
Instead, Stefansson relies on a long tradition of scholars who identify the roots of 
Western civilization in Europe’s Greco-Roman heritage, a history that has 
subsequently been problematized both by those who stress that this tradition is 
actually a Euro-African-Asian hybrid (e.g. Bernal 1991) and by those who stress that 
the European roots of “Western Civilization” are themselves diverse and not strictly 
Mediterranean (e.g. Gress 1998).  
 In identifying the Polar Mediterranean as the next center of Western (or 
global) civilization, Stefansson fuses the classicist identification of the 
Mediterranean as Europe’s culture hearth with fin-de-siècle racialist theories that 
exalt the achievements and strength of Europe’s Nordic race (e.g. Grant 1921; 
Günther 1992 [1927]; Ripley 1899). In the process of transposing the 
Mediterranean vision of Europe’s essence to the continent’s northern limits, 
Stefansson reproduces a problem that inevitably emerges when one locates a 
region’s essence at its borders: Borders are places where cultures mix and, if 
regional essences exist in pure form anywhere, they are least likely to be found at 
the border. 
Intellectual historians who have sought to locate Europe’s essence in the 
Mediterranean border region have accommodated this conundrum by erasing 
African and Asian influences on Greco-Roman (and hence European) thought 
(Bernal 1991) and by casting the Mediterranean Sea itself as a seemingly 
impenetrable, continent-defining barrier of metaphysical proportions (Lewis & 
Wigen 1997). More broadly, these efforts reflect a modern-era trend of constructing 
a one-to-one, mutually inclusive equivalence between Whiteness and European 
heritage (Bonnett 1998). In the Arctic, Stefansson constructed the North as a 
European space by inventing the racial category of the “Blonde Eskimo,” the mixed 
offspring of Inuit and early Norse settlers (Stefansson 1928). This Whitening (or 
Europeanization) of the North complemented the contemporaneous effort to recast 
Vikings not as frontier barbarians but as essential Europeans, a discursive move that 
brought Iceland as well into the European fold (Oslund 2011). Today, this myth of a 
northern mediterranean Euro-American (and White) circumpolar region continues 
in Canadian efforts to define the nation as a North American extension of Nordic 
Europe, a Great White North that is imagined to ground the identity of the nation’s 
(overwhelmingly non-Arctic) citizens (Baldwin, Cameron, & Kobayashi 2011; Grace 
2007; Shields 1992). 
 
Mediterraneans as zones of (dis)unity – Scholars of Europe’s Mediterranean 
strategy note that efforts by Europe to link with its southern neighbors do more 
than simply establish norms for external relations. They also serve to define what 
(and where) Europe is. Policy preferences toward the Mediterranean inevitably 
reflect ideas about, for instance, whether one can be European without being 
Mediterranean as well as whether individual countries on the other side of the 
Mediterranean should have the same role as the EU in determining Mediterranean 
policy (Celata & Coletti 2012; Jones 2006; Jones & Clark 2008). In other words, in 
defining its Mediterranean character, Europe defines not just its external others but 
also its very identity and, in the process, the relationship between the whole of the 
European project and its constituent parts. 
In the European (and North American) Arctic, as in the European 
Mediterranean, this leads to a second problem with defining a region’s essence 
through a peripheral zone of connection: How does one situate the individual who 
resides distant from the periphery that gives the region its iconic status? This 
creates an ideological dilemma for the Canadian official who seeks to build a sense 
of nationhood among individual Canadians who have never been to, and have no 
desire to make a pilgrimage to, the country’s Arctic north; the Nazi official who 
realizes that, according to dominant racial classifications of the time, the majority of 
ethnic Germans are not Nordic but Alpine; or, more contemporaneously, the EU 
official in Brussels who would like to dismiss the fiscally profligate Greeks and 
Italians as not upholding the ideal of European restraint but who can only go so far 
in questioning the European character of the lands of Socrates and Cicero. Much the 
same has occurred as Europe has developed its Arctic policy. As Europe defines its 
essence in its borders (or in specific border regions), questions emerge regarding 
what this alleged essence means to actors located far from the border region but 
who think of themselves as part of Europe. Practically, these questions are reflected 
in a debate over whether non-Arctic European states should have a voice in 
determining the EU’s Arctic policy. 
Individuals from both Arctic and non-Arctic European states have pointed to 
the Mediterranean when making their respective arguments for exclusion or 
inclusion of non-Arctic states from the EU’s Arctic policy-making process. Arguing 
for exclusion, a Greenlandic government official referenced the Mediterranean to 
make the case that the Arctic lay at Europe’s margin, and thus it was an 
inappropriate arena for intervention by non-Arctic European states: 
Of course we would like to hear what others have to say. But this region is no 
more different than the Mediterranean, right? In principle. What can we 
actually say … we have nothing to say about what happens within the 
Mediterranean. Or with [relations with] Africa. Because that's their area, and 
they have a say-so there. In the Mediterranean, the countries around the 
Mediterranean decide what happens there. They will not, absolutely not 
accept us coming there saying you should do this and that. And it’s the same 
up here, in principle. (Author’s interview, Nuuk, July 2010)1 
Conversely, a non-Arctic member of the European Union’s delegation to the 
European Parliament’s Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 
referenced the Mediterranean to justify why non-Arctic countries should be involved 
in Arctic policy making: 
The EU is partly Arctic in a way, and I mean you can also compare it to the 
Mediterranean policy of the EU. I mean, not all EU member states are 
Mediterranean, obviously. Maybe it is more obvious that the EU should have 
an interest in the Mediterranean region, but I mean you could also use the 
same argument and say that all the European states are Mediterranean states. 
(Author’s interview, Oslo, June 2010)2 
Despite their opposing views, both individuals quoted here constructed their 
arguments in similar ways, referencing the position of Europe in the Mediterranean 
to argue for the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of non-Arctic states playing a role in 
determining Europe’s Arctic policy. In the northern mediterranean, as in the 
southern, the specification of processes for defining Europe’s relations with its 
external “other” have intersected with European attempts at defining itself. 
 
Mediterraneans as sites of commercial opportunity – Just as references to the 
Mediterranean are employed to construct a notion of the Arctic as a space of 
continental (or racial) essence that, to a greater or lesser extent, has internal as well 
as external borders and hierarchies, these references also are employed to identify 
the Arctic as a space of commercial opportunity. In this respect, promoters of Arctic 
development reach back to the Greek ideal of the emporion, the port city that, 
through its location at a maritime crossroads, first emerges as a trade hub and later 
becomes a point where the free flow of ideas leads to civilizational cultural, social, 
and political innovations. This is what Stefansson was referring to when discussing 
the economic dynamism that will accrue to Arctic islands once they emerge as 
cosmopolitan nodes on heavily trafficked trade routes. Today, it is an image most 
frequently promoted by Iceland, where officials’ speak of the potential for becoming 
an “Arctic Singapore.” As Icelandic Ambassador Gunnar Pálsson stated in a 2006 
speech titled “The Polar Mediterranean: Change and Opportunities for the Countries 
of the Arctic Rim”: 
We may now find ourselves on the threshold of a new epoch, where changes 
in the patterns of climate, settlements, energy consumption, trade and 
transportation will begin to converge in a way that could transform the 
world we live in. In effect, we could be moving towards the activation of the 
Arctic in a manner that would radically alter, if not reverse, our conceptions 
of the world´s periphery and center. We could, in effect, be moving towards a 
world with the pole in the middle; the Polar Mediterranean. (Gunnar Pálsson 
2006) 
 Although explicit and implicit references to the Arctic as a mediterranean 
zone of opportunity, where trade links can lead to cultural exchange and economic 
development, are especially prevalent in Iceland, they appear throughout the region, 
and they are the culmination of a pattern that prevailed throughout the twentieth 
century whereby pundits and promoters celebrated the emergence of a “New North” 
(Stuhl 2013). Mikhail Gorbachev did not specifically reference the Mediterranean in 
his landmark 1987 Murmansk speech, in which he announced, “The Arctic is not 
only the Arctic Ocean but also….the place where the Eurasian, North American, and 
Asia Pacific regions meet, where the frontiers come close to one another and the 
interests of states…cross (cited in Keskitalo 2004, p. 43),” but his vision, which is 
often credited with laying the groundwork for the formation of the Arctic Council 
ten years later, effectively reproduced Stefansson’s image of a Polar Mediterranean. 
A similar theme of proximity across an inland sea fostering shared interests, 
and thus opportunity, was voiced by former Alaska governor and US Vice 
Presidential candidate Sarah Palin in her much-lampooned “You can see Russia from 
Alaska” comment (ABC News 2009).3 This comment was expanded upon by another 
Alaskan elected official: 
The first geography teacher I ever had suggested that civilizations come 
about because of interaction and accessibility, and you know, that’s what 
classic geography says, “Look at rivers, ports, how does this all 
happen?”….[With climate change] I’d be fascinated to kind of take the 
classical geographic thinking and say, “Okay, what will be the ties that will 
endure, that will ultimately change this?” And I don’t know what they are; 
there’s a lot of potential right now and there are some things that [will] work 
and things that won’t work, but now, you take a look at the vision of the 
Arctic, where the unified Arctic is kind of a Mediterranean play and so 
forth….And that is the question that I’d ask if I had a National Science 
Foundation grant to look at cooperation in the Arctic. Because in the end, all 
the meetings we do, they’re fun meetings. But what endures is what people 
are going to do with Arctic regular commerce. (Author’s interview, 
Anchorage, June 2010) 
Mediterraneans as geostrategic zones of conflict – Notwithstanding this dream 
of free and peaceful commerce across a tamed inland sea, whenever there is 
interaction there is also the potential for hostility. As such, just as the designation of 
the Arctic as a “Polar Mediterranean” is used to promote a vision of Europe (and 
North America) peacefully extending its frontiers, it is also used to suggest a vision 
of the inland sea as an arena of conflict.  
 Thus, during the height of the Second Cold War, U.S. sociologist Joseph 
Roucek drew directly on Stefansson’s writings about aerospace technology uniting 
the Arctic to assert a new age of integration brought about by the intercontinental 
ballistic missile: 
The “Arctic Mediterranean” is a perfect example of an area in which 
technological advances, especially in aviation, have caused far-reaching 
changes which force a new evaluation of locational factors in the region. 
(Roucek 1983, p. 463) 
The key “locational factor” for Roucek was that the Soviet Union was now much 
closer to the United States than most Americans realized, and that strategic 
resources should therefore be deployed northward. A similar perspective was taken 
in 2010 by the Standing Committee on National Defence in Canada’s House of 
Commons when it issued a report on “Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty” (Government of 
Canada 2010), which begins with a reference to Stefansson’s concept of the Polar 
Mediterranean. The authors of the report associate the rise of the Polar 
Mediterranean not with the emergent air transport sector identified by Stefansson 
nor with the missiles identified by Roucek but with climate change and the end of 
the Cold War. Notwithstanding this shift in proximate cause, however, the authors of 
the Senate report, much like Roucek, assert that the rise of the Polar Mediterranean 
requires a muscular response, and thus Canada is urged to adopt a policy that 
integrates national development with national defense so that the Polar 
Mediterranean can be a site of opportunity and not insecurity. Similar themes 
appear in Norway’s Arctic strategy (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). 
 In the past decade a number of geopolitical scholars and journalists have 
sought to use the Mediterranean to understand the security issues at stake in the 
Arctic. Writing in Foreign Affairs, former US Coast Guard officer Scott Borgerson 
wrote: 
The Mediterranean Sea is somewhat similar to the Arctic Ocean, but its 
littoral states have always had clearer historical claims. (Borgerson 2008, p. 
73) 
Borgerson’s point is highly contestable, not least because it is difficult to find factual 
support for his core premise about historical claims being weaker in the Arctic than 
in the Mediterranean. But for purposes of this article Borgerson’s statement is 
interesting because he sees the similarity between the two mediterraneans as so 
strong that he can go on to specify a unique point of difference (clarity of historical 
claims). 
 Borgerson is not alone in using a comparison of mediterraneans to highlight 
the unique conditions of instability faced by the Polar Mediterranean. According to 
military affairs journalist Barry Zellen, the only factor that to date has prevented the 
Arctic from emerging as a mediterranean region of exchange and investment is its 
climate. Now, however, with climate change the Arctic has the potential to emerge 
as a “new Mediterranean.” Up to this point, Zellen’s argument resembles the 
Canadian Parliament’s reinterpretation of Stefansson, but then Zellen reaches past 
Stefansson to Sir Halford Mackinder, presenting a much darker view of the coming 
Arctic thaw, as rising opportunity is paired with rising insecurity: 
In terms popularized by Sir Halford John Mackinder, the famed theorist of 
geopolitics, the long isolated “Lenaland” along the Arctic basin will transform 
into a highly productive and strategically important “Rimland,” transforming 
the Arctic into tomorrow's equivalent of the Mediterranean, a true strategic, 
economic and military crossroads of the world. (Zellen 2008) 
 An even darker view of the Polar Mediterranean is held by naval strategist 
James Holmes, who asserts in the subtitle of his contribution to Foreign Policy, “The 
Arctic is the Mediterranean of the 21st Century” (Holmes 2012). Through a detailed 
reapplication of classic works of geopolitics by the likes Mahan, Mackinder, and 
Spykman to the physical geographic and geoeconomic conditions of the 21st century, 
Holmes concludes that the Arctic is set to emerge as a mediterranean sea of 
increasing significance. Geophysically, the Arctic may not be that different than 
other mediterraneans like the Caribbean Sea, the South China Sea, or the 
Mediterranean. However, for Holmes the Arctic and the Mediterranean have a 
further defining feature that distinguishes them from the other two: multipolarity: 
The logic that drove great-power competition in the Mediterranean Sea for 
many centuries could well take hold in the polar Mediterranean. Like the 
Mediterranean, the Arctic Ocean is ringed by strong seafaring nations, 
including Russia and five NATO allies. This stands in stark contrast to the 
Caribbean Sea and…the South China Sea [in which] a single strong power 
overshadows many lesser ones. (Holmes 2012) 
As with Borgerson, many of Holmes’ facts are disputable. Arguably, for instance, the 
South China Sea has two “strong powers,” not one (the United States as well as 
China) and it is difficult to accept Holmes’ implication that Iceland, one of the five 
NATO allies that rings the Arctic, is a “strong seafaring nation.” These questionable 
assertions aside, Holmes, like Borgerson elevates the mediterranean to the level of a 
fixed category, stable enough that he can differentiate the category into two sub-
categories: multipolar mediterraneans (the Arctic and the Mediterranean) and 
unipolar mediterraneans (the Caribbean and the South China Sea). 
 
The “other” side of the Polar Mediterranean – In addition to assuming the 
existence (and significance) of the mediterranean category, Holmes also assumes a 
binary division of the Polar Mediterranean inherited from the Cold War: the division 
between “Russia” and “five NATO allies.” While tensions between Russia and NATO 
certainly exist, especially since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and some of 
these tensions have been played out in the Arctic, the scripting of Arctic geopolitics 
as a binary competition between Russia and “The West” is an oversimplification. 
Russia generally has joined with other Arctic nations in following established norms 
of international diplomacy and rules of international law and Russia has a record of 
forging common cause with specific Western nations on areas of shared common 
interest (e.g. first Soviet and later Russian shared interest with Canada on 
minimizing limits on sovereign rights to control access to the Northern Sea Route 
and the Northwest Passage) (Anderson 2009; Knecht & Keil 2013). Notwithstanding 
these complexities and nuances that characterize great power politics in the Arctic, 
when one views the region through the spatial lens of mediterraneanism one carries 
forth the binary ideal of an “other” that lies on the far side of the inland sea, 
inexorably connected, but also profoundly “different.” In the Polar Mediterranean, 
this “other” is invariably Russia, a country whose role in Arctic geopolitics 
narratives parallels that of the Arab “Orient” in the Mediterranean or, as Michael 
Bravo (2009) notes, that of Africa in the modernization narratives that drive the 
global development industry. 
 This construction of an external but proximate “other” is multifaceted 
because, as scholars of postcolonialism note, wherever there is difference across an 
integrative divide there is also the possibility of redemption, an attitude that 
informs initiatives to foster economic (and social and political) development as well 
as the general principle of liberal interventionism. And this, in turn, circles back to 
Giaccaria and Minca, who identify in the Mediterranean (and, I would argue, other 
mediterraneans, including the Arctic) “[a] paradoxical interplay…that alternate[s] 
narratives of homogeneity and continuity with those of hetereogeneity and 
discontinuity” (Giaccaria & Minca 2011, p. 348). The flexibility of the mediterranean 
image – in which the maritime center both erases and magnifies difference – and the 
intensity of the resultant “paradoxical interplay” allows individuals to use the image 
to support very different political diagnoses. For Gorbachev, Palin, Gunnar Pálsson, 
and the interviewed Alaskan official, the paradoxical qualities of the Polar 
Mediterranean are used to highlight its potential as a space of peace wherein 
differences may be overcome through commerce and exchange. For Roucek, 
Borgerson, Zellen, and Holmes, by contrast, these same qualities are used to 
highlight its potential as a space of conflict wherein encounters between naturally 
separated nations are likely to breed distrust, acrimony, and, for Holmes in 
particular, armed conflict. The perspective of mediterraneanism thus carries with it 
ideals of both hope and fear in relations with the “other,” and this is as true on 
Europe’s northern frontier as it is on its southern. 
 A third perspective on the Arctic as a mediterranean where the West meets 
its “others” was articulated by a U.S. State Department official who effectively 
combined the Roucek/Borgerson/Zellen/Holmes position (that, as a divided space, 
the Arctic is a natural arena of discord and potential military conflict) with the 
Gorbachev/Palin/Pálsson/Alaskan position (that, as a maritime space, it is 
fundamentally a cosmopolitan arena of connection and potential commercial and 
cultural exchange): 
A difficulty for the Russians is learning how to be part of the community. The 
old Soviet ways of doing things still seem to be ingrained in them….I think 
part of it is the Russian mindset, and getting past that….In some ways, it’s like 
[the Russians] have to learn to play nice with others, and the Arctic may be 
the place to do that. (Author’s interview, Washington, DC, June 2010) 
For this official, the inland sea at the center of the Arctic, like the Mediterranean, 
creates divisions: In this instance, it divides the North between those who have the 
social skills and communitarian ethos to participate in the diplomatic community 
and those who lack these skills and ethos. However, it also creates the connections 
that could lead to transcendence of these divisions (the possibility that the Russians 
will “learn to play nice with others”). Interaction between these disparate neighbors 
is therefore seen as potentially productive, and increasingly likely due to 
connections brought about by the inland sea. However, such connections are also 
recognized as inevitably fraught with tension due to superorganic cultural 
differences that result from the geographic division mediated by that same 
intervening ocean and due to the power relations projected across it. Russia is 
understood as having the potential to be a cooperative party to negotiations, but 
only if the Russians learn to act like the NATO allies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Giaccaria and Minca call Mediterranean geographies “the source and the mirror of 
many European postcolonial geographies” (Giaccaria & Minca 2011, p. 346). 
Although they are referring to Europe’s relations with its more distant “others,” 
similar parallels exist with the adjacent lands (and waters) on Europe’s proximate 
northern fringe. As I have suggested in this article, the Polar Mediterranean, like the 
Mediterranean itself, constructs relations and ideals of proximity and distance, 
difference and unity, and power and cooperation. Thus it is not surprising that the 
Mediterranean is often consciously deployed as a referent to reproduce similar 
imaginaries in the North.  
 As in the Mediterranean, however, this linking of so many disparate images 
and desires to the trope of the inland sea produces a degree of tension within the 
Polar Mediterranean image. Duncan Depledge and Klaus Dodds allude to this 
tension when they write, 
The analogy with the Mediterranean is striking, highlighting on the one hand 
an area of common concern for neighbouring states (with the potential for 
both conflict and co-operation) but on the other, a space of transit (Depledge 
& Dodds 2011, p. 72). 
I agree with Depledge and Dodds that the use of the analogy is “striking” in the ways 
in that it conjures up the potential for both conflict and cooperation in the region. 
However, I have argued here that the analogy is also potentially pernicious, for 
many of the same reasons that have been noted by others with reference to 
Europe’s southern maritime border. Through references to both the (upper-case) 
Mediterranean and the (lower-case) mediterranean socio-spatial ideal-type, the 
trope of the Polar Mediterranean naturalizes and dehistoricizes the idea of the Polar 
region as one of progressive modernization, unbroachable difference, and timeless 
binary oppositions. These understandings of the North, in turn, set the stage for 
future conflict, both between states on opposite sides of the Polar Mediterranean 
and, within each state, between inhabitants of its Polar Mediterranean region and 
those without significant regional roots. Mediterraneanization is as much an 
“othering” process on Europe’s northern border as it is on its southern border. 
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1 Greenland is not a part of the European Union, but that has no bearing on the 
government official’s remark. His point was not that EU countries (or the EU itself) 
should not have a role in Arctic governance. Rather, his point was that decisions 
about the Arctic should be made by state parties that are proximate to the Arctic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ocean, just as Mediterranean policy should be made by state parties that are 
proximate to the Mediterranean Sea. 
2 All interviews referenced in this article were carried out as part of the US National 
Science Foundation-funded project on “Territorial Imaginaries and Arctic 
Sovereignty Claims” (grant number BCS-0921436). The Nuuk and Oslo interviews 
referenced here were conducted by Hannes Gerhardt, a collaborating researcher in 
the “Territorial Imaginaries” project, and I am grateful to him for making transcripts 
available for use in this article. Complete findings from the “Territorial Imaginaries” 
and the subsequent European Commission-funded project on “Global Alternatives 
for an Interconnected Arctic (Marie Curie action IIF-GA-2010-275846) can be found 
in Steinberg et al. 2015).  
3 Palin’s actual statement – which did not include the assertion that she could see 
Russia from her home or anywhere else on mainland Alaska – simply stressed that 
Russia was an important and proximate neighbor and that during her tenure as 
Alaska’s governor Russia had commanded her attention. 
